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Mindreading Deception in Dialog
Alistair M.C. Isaaca, Will Bridewellb
aInstitute for Research in Cognitive Science, University of Pennsylvania,
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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of detecting deceptive agents in a conver-
sational context. We argue that distinguishing between types of deception is
required to generate successful action. This consideration motivates a novel tax-
onomy of deceptive and ignorant mental states, emphasizing the importance of
an ulterior motive when classifying deceptive agents. After illustrating this tax-
onomy with a sequence of examples, we introduce a Framework for Identifying
Deceptive Entities (FIDE) and demonstrate that FIDE has the representational
power to distinguish between the members of our taxonomy. We conclude with
some conjectures about how FIDE could be used for inference.
Keywords: mental state ascription, ulterior motives, lying, false belief
1. Introduction
Every productive interaction between humans depends critically on the pro-
cess of mindreading: the attribution of mental states to other agents. If an-
other person can successfully infer your beliefs and desires, then that person
can interact with you strategically, anticipating and preparing for your actions
to compete or coordinate. For artificial agents to successfully participate in
complex social interactions, they also will need strategies for mindreading.
Ideal mindreading requires multimodal input, including utterances, eye move-
ments, body gestures, galvanic skin response, and other features. However, hu-
mans routinely interact successfully in limited cue conditions. For example, in
an internet chat session with a stranger, we lack access to facial expressions,
body language, and past experiences with that person. Instead, we must at-
tribute beliefs and desires to the stranger based solely on the words typed and
our general knowledge of such situations. A limited cue scenario such as this of-
fers a delineated testing ground for mindreading frameworks for artificial agents.
A considerable amount of work exists that attempts to infer mental state
from dialog content alone (e.g., Cohen and Perrault, 1979; Carberry and Lam-
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bert, 1999), but the bulk of this literature assumes agents are cooperative and
speak veridically. In contrast, this paper introduces a general framework for
mindreading from dialog with the express goal of detecting deception. More
specifically, we take as our primary focus the problem of distinguishing be-
tween different types of deceptive and sincere speech. Our motivation is the
observation that the correct response to an utterance differs depending on its
categorization (as a lie, a sincere statement of false belief, a veridical statement
uttered with deceptive intent, etc.). One might confront a liar, but gently cor-
rect a sincere but ignorant speaker. In some contexts, one might even decide to
participate in a falsehood if it is strategically efficacious.
To crystallize the problem, we concentrate on the special case in which an
agent believes some proposition P and his interlocutor utters not(P ). In this
situation, mindreading is critical for determining how beliefs about the other
agent should be revised and deciding what further actions to take. Does the
speaker utter not(P ) sincerely? Is he lying? If the former, the agent might act
to educate the speaker by providing his evidence for P ; if the latter, we claim
that the agent must infer the speaker’s ulterior motive. The need to correctly
calculate response on the basis of a conflict between a speaker’s utterance and
the hearer’s belief appears in many conversational scenarios including police in-
terrogations, court testimony, physician–patient interactions, political debates,
and even water-cooler talk.
The literature on deception emphasizes a number of fine grained distinctions
for characterizing different attitudes an agent might have toward an utterance.
In addition to lying and distinct from the sincere categories of false belief and
ignorance, there are other less well studied forms of deception. For example,
paltering involves speaking truthfully with the intent to deceive (Schauer and
Zeckhauser, 2009), as when a car dealer (veridically) emphasizes the quality of a
car’s wheels to distract the buyer from a problem with the engine. Bullshitting
involves speaking without either knowing or caring about the truth value of
one’s utterance (Frankfurt, 2005). A less discussed, but also interesting example
is pandering, when the speaker does not care about the truth value of their
utterance, instead speaking it solely because they believe the listener desires to
hear it. Whereas the philosophical literature on deception has focused primarily
on the moral status of these classes of utterances, we focus on how to distinguish
among them in a limited-cue, conversational situation.
Our strategy differs from previous work in that we (1) categorize a broad
variety of deceptive states within a unified framework, (2) emphasize the im-
portance of ulterior motives rather than “intent to deceive,” and (3) propose
a representation designed to be rich enough to support the detection of decep-
tion. The claim that deception and sincere discourse are qualitatively distinct
is uncontroversial. We go a step further and assert that attempts to treat bull-
shitting, lying, pandering, and paltering as a single activity will lead to as much
confusion as treating false belief, ignorance, and veridical speech as one and the
same. The efforts of Sakama et al. (2010) to logically define and analyze lying,
bullshit, and paltering—which they call “deception”—support our assertion.
However, their logical analysis turns on acceptance of the condition that liars
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intend the hearer to believe their fallacious utterance, which has been hotly dis-
puted (Mahon, 2008). We sidestep that debate by relying on the more general
concept of an ulterior motive: intuitively, a goal with higher priority than those
goals implied by the conversational context. The intent to deceive may follow
from such a goal, but it is the ulterior motive itself which ultimately determines
action. These considerations motivate our Framework for Identifying Decep-
tive Entities (FIDE). We argue that FIDE includes features both necessary and
sufficient for a mindreading system to detect deception.
We structure the rest of this paper around FIDE. In the next section, we de-
velop a classification of deceptive states, illustrating our distinctions with multi-
ple interpretations of a short dialog. We argue for the necessity of representing
the goals and beliefs of other agents, including their potential ignorance and
ulterior motives, so as to fully characterize these distinctions. Section 3 intro-
duces FIDE and our basic formalism for representing mental states. Section 4
illustrates the framework’s expressive power by applying it to examples from
section 2. Success at representing our examples demonstrates the sufficiency of
FIDE for capturing our distinctions. We then discuss strategies for inferring
deceptive states within a system that implements this framework. Finally, we
summarize our argument and anticipate future research.
2. An Example: The Water Cooler
To see more clearly the necessity of mindreading and reasoning about ulterior
motives for dialog, consider the following simple exchange:
Scene: Bartleby & Bartleby, LLP
(Jones and Pratt stand next to a gurgling water cooler.)
Jones: So, I hear Smith is going to be promoted to VP.
Pratt: That’s what you get for kissing old man Bartleby’s ass.
Jones’ response to Pratt will depend critically on his own mental attitude to-
ward Smith’s promotion. For the sake of argument, assume that Jones believes
Smith’s promotion to be merit-based. How then should he interpret and respond
to Pratt’s assertion that it was the result of cronyism?
The most socially generous interpretation of Pratt’s statement is as a straight-
forward instance of false belief. For example, Pratt may have observed but mis-
interpreted conversations between Smith and Bartleby, forming the sincerely
held but inadequately justified and ultimately incorrect belief that the promo-
tion was an act of cronyism. In this circumstance, Pratt’s utterance may have
no motive behind it other than the straightforward Gricean mandate to speak
the truth. If Jones infers that motive, he might respond by offering Pratt ev-
idence that Smith’s promotion was merit-based, working with him to realize
their shared goal of reaching the truth of the situation.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the interpretation of Pratt’s utterance
as a full-blown instance of lying. For example, Pratt may know full well that
3
Smith’s promotion is merit-based. His assertion to the contrary must then
be based on some ulterior motive. For instance, Pratt may have the goal of
bringing Jones to believe that Smith’s promotion was undeserved. This goal
is ulterior in the sense that it contradicts the default Gricean assumption that
the purpose of conversation is to veridically convey truth about the state of
the world. As we shall see, the presence of an ulterior motive most thoroughly
characterizes deceptive speech, not the speaker’s attitude toward the truth value
of his utterance. If Jones identifies Pratt’s utterance as a lie, his primary goal
then becomes the discovery of Pratt’s ulterior motive: why does Pratt want to
manipulate him?
False belief and lying offer the most straightforward interpretations of Pratt’s
utterance, but other subtle variations exist. For instance, suppose Pratt lacks a
firm view of his claim’s truth value. In that case, he speaks from a position of
ignorance. Unless he simply misspoke, this interpretation requires some back-
story to be plausible. Perhaps in suggesting cronyism, Pratt intends to “fish
for the truth” from Jones. Shame at his ignorance of the full situation prompts
Pratt to say something in an attempt to elicit Jones’ beliefs, not sway them.
In this case, Pratt’s utterance lacks an ulterior motive as he indeed cares about
the truth of the situation. If Jones infers Pratt’s ignorance, much as in the case
of false belief, the natural response is to provide evidence that the promotion
was merit-based.
Contrast pure ignorance with the case in which Pratt neither knows nor cares
about the truth value of his utterance. Frankfurt (2005) calls utterances made
with this attitude bullshit.1 If Pratt makes his utterance without any regard
for its truth, then he must have some goal unrelated to truth in making it:
an ulterior motive. As traditionally conceived, the motives behind bullshitting
tend to be more innocuous than those behind lying. Pratt may simply desire
to appear informed about office politics, or he may simply enjoy arguing at the
water-cooler. Crucially, however, sincere but incorrect utterances (ignorance
and false belief) and bullshit motivate different responses from Jones. One
might seek to educate an ignorant party, but there is little value in attempting
to educate a bullshitter. The bullshitter’s goal is neither to learn the truth nor
to hide it, nor even to preserve the consistency of his beliefs. Instead, he seeks
only to preserve the consistency of his narrative. Individual statements may or
may not be true, but neither case will slow or spur the flow of bullshit more
than the other.
Pandering is a special case of bullshit found in the political realm. This
category resembles bullshit because the speaker does not care about the truth
value of his utterance (although he may possibly know it). However, a specific
ulterior motive distinguishes pandering, namely the speaker aims to boost his
estimation in the mind of the listener by uttering something the listener wants to
hear. If Pratt himself does not care about the reason behind Smith’s promotion,
1Other analyses of our common sense notion of bullshit are possible, however, for instance
“Cohen bullshit” (Cohen, 2002).
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Table 1: The possible mental state attributions by the hearer after the speaker has uttered
not(P ). We use not(P ) to signify the negation of the proposition P and ig(P ) to signify
ignorance of P , to be discussed further below. Bh = hearer’s belief. BhBs = hearer’s belief
about speaker’s belief. BhBsBh = hearer’s belief about speaker’s belief about hearer’s belief.
Bh BhBs BhBsBh ulterior motive (UM) No UM
P P P lying misspoke
P P ig(P ) lying misspoke
P P not(P ) lying / pandering misspoke
P ig(P ) P bullshit ignorance
P ig(P ) ig(P ) bullshit ignorance
P ig(P ) not(P ) bullshit / pandering ignorance
P not(P ) P paltering false belief
P not(P ) ig(P ) paltering false belief
P not(P ) not(P ) paltering / pandering false belief
but believes Jones to be bitter or jealous about it, then he may claim that the
promotion was the result of cronyism with the goal of increasing his standing
in the eyes of Jones.
This example highlights the expressive power our model of mental states will
need to characterize the nuanced goal attributions required to mindread in a
dialog context. From Smith’s perspective, it is necessary to think not only that
Pratt believes the promotion to be merited but also that Pratt believes that
Jones believes (or wants to believe) that it resulted from favoritism. We will
need to be able to handle arbitrary embedding of belief and desire operators
to characterize cases such as this, where Pratt believes that Jones desires that
Pratt believes that P .
A final form of deception worth considering is paltering (Schauer and Zeck-
hauser, 2009). Paltering occurs when a speaker knowingly speaks the truth, but
with an ulterior motive. Typical cases occur when the speaker utters a minor
truth to distract from the point of primary interest. For example, a used car
dealer might mislead a buyer by pointing to a car’s virtues to distract from its
failings. In order to interpret the present example as an instance of paltering,
we’ll need to let the pragmatic meaning of Pratt’s utterance (Smith’s promo-
tion was the result of cronyism) come apart from it’s colloquial meaning (Smith
flattered old man Bartleby). Suppose, for instance, Pratt knows that Smith’s
promotion is merit-based, but he also knows that Smith has frequently spoken
in a flattering manner to Bartleby. By (truthfully) mentioning Smith’s flattery
in the context of a discussion of his promotion, he attempts to mislead Jones
into thinking cronyism rather than merit was the cause of the promotion.
Each of these interpretations of the Bartleby example has a different signa-
ture in Jones’ attribution of mental states to Pratt. Table 1 summarizes the
distinctions introduced here. (To connect this table to the water cooler exam-
ple, take h to be Jones, s to be Pratt, and P to be “Smith’s promotion was
merit-based.”) Note that the truth value of P is immaterial here; in analyzing
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how the hearer attributes mental states to the speaker, it is what the hearer
believes that matters, not whether those beliefs are correct. The presence of
an ulterior motive marks the distinction between a deceptive and a misguided
utterance. The exact type of deception then depends upon the valence of belief
in P attributed to the speaker by the hearer.
3. FIDE: A Framework for Mindreading
As the previous section demonstrates, mindreading is necessary for dialog in
general and lie detection in particular. We propose a framework for mindread-
ing that we call FIDE, Framework for Identifying Deceptive Entities. FIDE is
limited to the synchronic representation of complex mental states and will need
to be supplemented with an inference procedure to support dynamic reasoning
about changes in mental state attribution. We discuss some heuristics for dy-
namic mindreading in section 5, but FIDE itself makes no assumptions about
how inference is implemented. Summarizing the implications of the previous
section, to effectively represent deceptive states, FIDE must be able to repre-
sent (1) beliefs about self and others, (2) the known ignorance of others, and
(3) ulterior motives.
The central component of FIDE is its explicit attribution of mental states
to other agents, preparing it for socially aware inference. The framework is
organized around agent models and designates one of these as the model of self.
All other agent models are nested under this model so that we might start from
Jones’s perspective and represent his model of Pratt or, more deeply, represent
his model of Pratt’s model of Bartleby. Each of these models contains mental
content that we take to be propositional in character, but we also allow for
properties useful during inference, such as justifications and entrenchment.
Each agent model contains two kinds of mental content: beliefs and goals.
Beliefs are taken to be true by the agent, and assessable as true or false by in-
specting reality. Goals represent desires about the state of the world and may be
satisfied by complementary beliefs. Whether a proposition constitutes a belief
or a goal is determined by the partition in which it is located. Importantly in
the case of deception, an agent may have goals for another agent’s beliefs. Fur-
thermore, we distinguish a special class of goals, which we call “ethical goals,”
characterized by two features: (1) they are ascribed by default to all agents;
(2) they are defeasible. An ethical goal is defeated when an agent prioritizes an
ordinary goal over the ethical goal.
To illustrate, during Jones’ conversation with Pratt, Jones maintains a model
of his conversational partner. The belief partition of his self model links to a
new model representing his beliefs about Pratt’s mental state. If he attributes
to Pratt beliefs or goals about the mental state of another agent (whether it
be Jones or some third party), he creates a third agent model with links to the
relevant partition in his Pratt model. The process can be iterated arbitrarily
deeply as needed. Syntactically, goal and belief operators can embed to access
the relevant content. For instance, we write (B Jones (B Pratt P )) to refer
to Jones’ belief that Pratt believes that P , and (B Jones (G Pratt (B Jones
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not(P )))) to indicate Jones’ belief that Pratt has a goal that Jones believe the
negation of P .
As a first approximation of mindreading, we take a cue from the ViewGen
approach (Ballim and Wilks, 1991) which was adapted by Lee (1998) to distin-
guish lying from false belief. In particular, we assume that child agent models
inherit the beliefs (but not the goals) of their parent agent through a process
of default ascription. In the case just described, FIDE would model Pratt as
implicitly believing everything that Jones does unless there is reason to think
otherwise. Only those beliefs of Pratt that differ from Jones’ are explicitly stored
in the Pratt model. Similarly, we assume that all agents share the same infer-
ence mechanisms and rules. This feature lets Jones simulate Pratt’s reasoning
using his own mechanisms and knowledge.
To represent scenarios in which Jones believes that Pratt’s epistemic state
differs from his own (or vice versa), we must be able to block the inheritance
of beliefs from the parent model to the child model. In FIDE, inheritance is
blocked when propositions contradicting those in the parent’s belief partition
are assigned to the child’s belief partition. For example, if Jones believes that
Pratt falsely believes not(P ), then we write (B Jones P ) and (B Jones (B Pratt
not(P ))), blocking inheritance of P into the Pratt model. To represent ignorance
by this method, we introduce a special operator, ig(), which we treat in the same
way as negation. If Jones believes Pratt is ignorant of P , then (B Jones P ) and
(B Jones (B Pratt ig(P ))), and again inheritance of P into the Pratt model is
blocked. Since beliefs are accessible by the agent that holds them, Pratt should
be understood as aware of his own ignorance. In other words, FIDE represents
known–knowns and known–unknowns, but not unknown–unknowns.
The final piece of FIDE is its ability to represent ulterior motives. Con-
ceptually these are the goals of an agent that differ from its stated or implied
goals. For instance, consider a patient in a hospital emergency room who re-
quests Vicodin to alleviate a severe headache. The patient’s stated goal is to
get relief from a specific pain, but Vicodin contains an addictive narcotic agent.
The patient may have an ulterior motive to procure Vicodin for recreational
purposes or to distribute it illegally. In deciding whether the patient’s request
for Vicodin is deceptive, the physician need not determine the specific ulterior
motive. Rather, the crucial task is to determine whether the patient is being
direct or pursuing some unstated agenda.
Ulterior motives are intimately connected to behavioral norms, as disingen-
uous agents may use normative expectations to hide their actual goals. The
notion of ethical goals lets FIDE support the ability to reason about behav-
ioral norms. In the context of lie detection, we are primarily interested in the
behavioral norm which Grice called the maxim of quality, i.e. the injunction
to only utter statements which one believes to be true. In FIDE, we represent
Grice’s maxim with the distinguished ethical goal T, the goal to only utter the
statement that-P if P can be found in the agent’s belief partition. Since T is
an ethical goal, any ordinary goal may defeat it, which we represent with the
defeat relation that operates over mental content. Such a goal is “ulterior” in
the technical sense that it lies beyond the pragmatic norms of conversation, but
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it may still play this role even if it is not “ulterior” in the colloquial sense of
being hidden or secret (though typically it will be).
We represent that goal X defeats T for agent Agt as (G Agt defeat(X, T)),
i.e. the derived goal defeat(X, T) appears in an agent’s goal partition whenever
X is an ulterior motive for that agent. This goal licenses the agent to perform
actions that violate T so long as they satisfy X. Importantly, defeat does not
necessarily imply conflict. That is, some action that does not contradict T
may also satisfy X. The patient requesting Vicodin for illicit purposes may
nevertheless really be in severe pain. Therefore, we take the position that any
X that defeats T is an example of an ulterior motive regardless of whether T is
violated by the agent’s actions.
In the previous section, we argued that these features—beliefs about other
agents, ignorance, and ulterior motives—are necessary for distinguishing among
several types of deception, and therefore for detecting deception in intelligent
agents. In the following section, we demonstrate the sufficiency of FIDE for
representing the mental states associated with each of the types of deception
discussed in section 2, thus confirming its representational adequacy.
4. Representational Power of FIDE
Section 2 began with a short dialog that helped illustrate seven different
types of deceptive or ignorant speech depending on context. Table 1 summarizes
these different categories and provides recipes for representing them in FIDE.
To illustrate, we will discuss three examples in detail, and leave the rest as an
exercise for the reader.
We treat Jones as the “top agent,” using FIDE to model his perspective
of the scenario including his beliefs about the beliefs and goals of Pratt. For
the remainder of this section, let P stand for the proposition that “Smith’s
promotion is merit-based.” Since Jones believes P , we find it in his belief
partition. When Jones meets Pratt for conversation, he adds a new partition to
his workspace representing Pratt’s mental state. If Pratt utters not(P ) honestly,
then by Jones’ lights, Pratt falsely believes not(P ). We represent this in FIDE
by adding not(P ) to the Pratt belief partition. Figure 1 illustrates this case
with A1 being Jones’ model of self and A2 being Jones’ model of Pratt.
Importantly, this representation is purely synchronic. If Jones represents
Pratt as in figure 1 before he hears Pratt utter not(P ), then hearing Pratt’s
utterance does not change Jones’ belief state. If Jones infers through some rule
that Pratt has spoken honestly on the basis of false belief after hearing Pratt’s
utterance, then he will need to add not(P ) to the belief partition of his Pratt
model to block the default inheritance of P from his beliefs to Pratt’s.
Now consider the simplest form of deceptive speech: lying. In this scenario,
Pratt believes P but utters not(P ) to deceive Jones. As with the previous
example, we are interested in representing Jones’ synchronic belief state. Fig-
ure 2 depicts Jones’ beliefs, with A1 being Jones’ model of self, A2 being his
model of Pratt, and A3 being his model of Pratt’s goals for Jones’ mental state.
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Jones                 A1
Beliefs
P
Goals
Pratt                   A2
Beliefs
not(P)
Goals
Figure 1: False belief. A1 and A2 are agent models with separate belief and goal partitions.
Here, Jones believes that Pratt falsely believes not(P ).
Jones                 A1
Beliefs
P
Goals
Pratt                   A2
Beliefs Goals
Jones                 A3
Beliefs
not(P)
Goals
Figure 2: Lying. A1, A2, and A3 are agent models. Here, Jones believes that Pratt has lied,
wanting him to believe not(P ).
Note that the Pratt model, A2, represents belief in P by default ascription.
Although Pratt believes P , he has the goal of bringing Jones to believe not(P ),
a fact depicted by the link from A2’s goal partition to A3 with not(P ) in the
belief partition. The link to agent model A3 represents a low level goal of agent
A2, call it X. X satisfies the definition of an ulterior motive as it motivates
utterances which contradict T, the maxim of quality (whether or not these ut-
terances are actually made!). In this model then, (G A2 defeat(X, T)) can be
derived.
Note that we are representing here the special case of lying in which the liar
explicitly intends the listener to believe the fallacious utterance. This intent
condition is controversial; for example, one might lie with the intent to deceive
an eavesdropping third party, not one’s conversational partner (see Mahon, 2008,
for a survey of arguments against the intent condition). FIDE has the power
to depict this special case,2 but it can also depict more general instances of
lying. For us, the defining features of a lie are (1) a contradiction between the
2And other special cases as well. For instance, as one reviewer suggested, a typical liar
may believe the hearer to be ignorant of the truth value of his utterance. FIDE can easily
represent this analysis, in the present example by adding the stipulation that (B Pratt (B
Jones Ig(P ))).
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Jones                 A1
Beliefs
P
Goals
Pratt                   A2
Beliefs Goals
Jones                 A3
Beliefs Goals
Pratt                 A4
Beliefs
not(P)
Goals
Figure 3: Pandering. A1, A2, A3, and A4 are agent models. Here, Jones believes that Pratt’s
declaration of not(P ) is pandering because Pratt thinks Jones wants Pratt to believe not(P ).
speaker’s belief and utterance and (2) presence of an ulterior motive (i.e., a goal
that defeats T).
While the explicit intent to deceive constitutes an ulterior motive, much
more abstract ulterior motives are also possible. Even if the intent to deceive
is present, it will in general follow from some hierarchically more important
goal. In the case of the Jones and Pratt dialog, Pratt may wish to incite a
rivalry between Jones and Smith to open the door for his own promotion. In
the Vicodin example mentioned in section 3, either the goal to get high or the
goal to sell Vicodin on the black market might motivate the patient to lie. Both
the more abstract motive and the more direct goal to generate a false belief
in the hearer satisfy the definition of an ulterior motive. In the context of
inference, awareness of the abstract goal on the part of the top agent might let
him infer that the speaker is lying or, conversely, awareness that the speaker
has an explicit intent to deceive might cause the top agent to infer a new goal,
namely to discover the abstract motive behind this low level intention.
As a final example, consider pandering. In table 1, we illustrated an analysis
of pandering in terms of tertiary structure: the top agent believes his interlocu-
tor believes the top agent believes his utterance, and furthermore the utterance
was made on the basis of this belief so as to ingratiate himself with the top
agent. A more subtle analysis can be provided if we use a quaternary structure,
easily accomplished with FIDE and shown in figure 3. Recall that the speaker
who panders says what he believes the listener wants to hear, but “wants to
hear” is plausibly interpreted as “desires the speaker to believe.” Jones, in be-
lieving that Pratt panders to him by saying not(P ), believes that Pratt believes
that Jones desires Pratt to believe not(P ). On this analysis, the actual belief P
explicitly represented in A1 and implied by default ascription in A2 and A3 is
irrelevant. Only the speaker’s beliefs about the listener’s goals are important.
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Thus, whether the politician who says, “Michigan has beautiful trees,” at a
fundraising rally in Detroit is pandering depends not on the attendees’ beliefs,
not on his beliefs, and not even on his beliefs about the attendees’s beliefs.
Rather, the crucial question is, does he believe the attendees want him to be-
lieve the trees in Michigan are beautiful? If he makes the remark on the basis
of that belief, then it constitutes pandering whether he or the attendees ac-
tually believe Michigan’s trees are beautiful. This is a case where the goal to
pander—to say what the hearer wants to hear—is indeed an ulterior motive, and
defeats T. Nevertheless, since the speaker’s own beliefs are irrelevant, T may be
accidentally satisfied because the action which satisfies the ulterior motive may
(incidentally) satisfy T as well.
Pandering and lying are relatively easy targets for detection since there is a
particular signature to the pattern of mental state attributions which generates
the lowest level ulterior motive. A much more challenging example is bullshit.
An utterance is bullshit if the speaker neither knows nor cares about its truth
value. Not caring about the truth value of P will defeat T, but what is the
ulterior motive? Unlike the cases of lying and pandering, there is no distinctive
low level goal here definable in terms of the pattern of mental state attribu-
tions between hearer and speaker. In addition to the presence of ig(P ) in his
belief partition, there is not much more that can be inferred directly about the
bullshitter other than simply that he possesses some goal that defeats T.
5. Strategies for Inference
We designed FIDE to represent mental state attributions synchronically. To
dynamically reason about changes in mental state attribution, the framework
requires an inference procedure. Our intention at this point is not to identify
particular inference rules, which we take to be outside the scope of this paper,
but to point out some characteristics those rules might evince and some strate-
gies that one might follow when developing them. We begin by identifying the
two principle questions whose answers are necessary for detecting deception,
follow this with scenarios where some categories of deception are ruled out by
context, and end with a recipe for inferring mental states.
The fundamental lesson of table 1 is that the question of mindreading when
a speaker states some proposition that contradicts the hearer’s beliefs breaks
down into two distinct parts:
1. Does the speaker have an ulterior motive?
2. What is the valence of the speaker’s attitude toward the proposition?
If the top agent has evidence for an answer to one of these questions, then he
can focus on discovering evidence for the other.
For instance, if Jones already knows Pratt has a goal S to sow strife at the
office and (B Jones (G Pratt defeat(S, T))), then he knows that Pratt is being
deceptive and need only determine whether Pratt has evidence for cronyism.
The nature of the evidence, if any, will establish the form of the deception.
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Conversely, if Jones knows Pratt was absent the previous month and therefore
has no inside knowledge about Smith’s promotion, represented as (B Jones (B
Pratt ig(P ))), then he can turn his attention to the question of ulterior motive: is
Pratt innocently fishing for more information or does he have some T-defeating
goal, and is thus bullshitting?
This example brings us to another important point: we can dramatically sim-
plify the problem by allowing plausible default assumptions. In many contexts,
one can safely ignore the categories of misspeaking, ignorance, and paltering
(schematically, imagine crossing these categories off in table 1). Thus from the
valence of the belief, one can directly infer the presence or absence of an ulterior
motive. From the assumption that there is no ulterior motive, one derives false
belief. If there is evidence for an ulterior motive, then the hearer can turn his
attention to determining whether the speaker believes P or ig(P ). In some con-
texts, this further problem can be simplified by taking lying as the default. In
water-cooler conversations, bullshit may be as common as lies; on the witness
stand, however, bullshit seems an unlikely analysis.
Another helpful heuristic dictates that the top agent infer only as much detail
about the speaker’s deceptive behavior as is necessary to guide action. Different
types of ignorant and deceptive speech require different actions in some contexts,
but not in others. If Jones and Pratt are peers, Jones may simply choose
to ignore Pratt’s comments once he determines there is an ulterior motive—
exactly how or why Pratt is deceiving him may be irrelevant. Suppose, however,
Pratt is Jones’ superior. Then determining Pratt’s exact form of deceptive
speech may be important. If Pratt is merely bullshitting, Jones may ignore the
comment, but if Pratt is lying, then Jones may take his comment as strategically
significant: does this mean Pratt hopes for more brown-nose behavior from
Jones? That he expects Jones to stay silent when the matter is brought up at
an upcoming staff meeting? Further inference is required.
In some cases, determining the type of deceptive speech will not be enough.
Consider again the Vicodin example. In the emergency room, the key issue
is whether the patient is lying: if not, then he should be treated; if so, he
should be turned away. Suppose, however, the exchange occurs with a general
practitioner. If the general practitioner determines the patient is lying, he may
still need to delve deeper and infer the full ulterior motive. A patient trying
to procure Vicodin for the black market may be sent away, but if the motive is
addiction, then the physician should recommend a treatment program.
A final implication of the discussion in previous sections is that special rules
for deceptive mental states with distinctive signatures may aid inference. In
particular, recall pandering. As discussed above and shown in figure 3, pander-
ing involves a distinct signature with quaternary embedding of the form belief
– belief – goal – belief, with the uttered proposition found in the inmost level of
nesting, A4’s beliefs. An inference system might take advantage of this analysis
by including a rule to infer the existence of an ulterior motive for the agent
represented by A2 whenever this distinctive signature is encountered.
Combining these insights produces a rough recipe for inferring deceptive
mental states using FIDE:
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1. Omit all categories of ignorance and deception permitted by the conver-
sational context.
2. Determine the specificity of mental state attribution required to generate
one’s next action.
3. Does the current signature fit any special inference rules?
4. Is there an ulterior motive?
5. What is the attitude of A2 toward the proposition P?
6. If mental state attribution is still not specific enough to generate an action,
posit either an ulterior motive or a propositional attitude (whichever is
missing) and return to 3.
Although this recipe is far from a well defined computational procedure or full
set of inference rules, we believe that it provides a reasonable starting point for
efforts in those directions.
6. Conclusion
This paper introduced FIDE, a framework for mental state attribution in
the context of dialog systems. After discussing some examples of the type of
mindreading required to effectively engage in realistic dialog, we introduced a
taxonomy of ignorant and deceptive states. We found that deception correlates
with the presence of an ulterior motive, but the exact type of deceptive state
depends upon both the speaker’s own attitude toward the spoken proposition
and his attribution of beliefs and goals about that proposition to the hearer.
We demonstrated the adequacy of FIDE for capturing the distinctions in our
taxonomy, then concluded with a brief discussion of some of the insights for
inferring mental states suggested by our analysis. Although the particulars will
depend upon the inference procedure used, we were able to suggest a basic recipe
for inferring deceptive states using FIDE in a dialog system.
In the future, we hope to further explore the modeling power of FIDE, espe-
cially with respect to the use of ethical goals. For instance, some taxonomies of
deceptive speech consider violations of Gricean maxims other than the maxim
of quality (e.g., Gupta et al., forthcoming). How much representational power
would we gain by explicitly including additional conversational maxims on the
list of ethical goals? We also intend to consider other general default ethical
assumptions (e.g., maxims not to steal or not to murder). Would explicitly
including these assumptions enable more powerful mindreading in a dialog con-
text? We are also intrigued by some examples of complex deceptive speech which
we cannot yet fully characterize. For instance, a caretaker suffering from Mun-
chausen by proxy attempts to deceive physicians into believing her ward suffers
from some chronic disease (Awadallah et al., 2005). This case is interesting from
a modeling standpoint as there appears to be an ulterior motive, but there is no
theory about what that motive itself is. Crucially, sufferers from Munchausen
by proxy themselves lack access to the motive, creating grave difficulties in
detecting and reasoning about the condition (Squires and R. H. Squires, 2010).
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Mindreading deceptive agents is a challenging task, but one required of any
realistic dialog system. We hope to have made some progress on simplifying
this problem with the analysis presented here.
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